The law requires action to be for the benefit of the deceased's spouse, partner, parent, and child
The NL Supreme Court has dismissed a medical malpractice lawsuit initiated by the brothers of the deceased patient due to lack of standing, among other reasons.
In Quinlan v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2023 NLSC 138, Joseph Quinlan experienced breathing difficulties and sought medical help from Dr. Catherine Mann, a thoracic surgeon. After a procedure to address pleural fluid buildup, he faced complications, including alcohol withdrawal and respiratory issues. He stayed in the Intensive Care Unit of St. Clare's Mercy Hospital and was later transferred to the Special Care Unit.
Despite various treatments, Joseph's health continued to deteriorate. He was placed on a ventilator to assist with his breathing. He eventually passed away at the age of 74. An autopsy revealed that he had been suffering from diseases related to his arteries and heart for some time, leading to a heart attack. He had scarring of the lungs, evidence of recent and old hemorrhage and buildup of fluid.
Joseph's brothers, John and Gerard Quinlan, sued Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority, alleging St. Clare's provided sub-standard care to Joseph. They also sued Dr. Mann, alleging that she did not obtain from Joseph proper informed consent and that the medical procedure she conducted resulted in Joseph's decline and eventual death.
John and Gerard Quinlan's standing to bring a suit as brothers of the deceased was challenged before the NL Supreme Court. The court noted that the Fatal Accidents Act requires that an action must be for the benefit of the deceased's spouse, partner, parent, and child to sustain an action on behalf of his estate.
The court found that Joseph had never married and had no children. He was not in any relationship at the time of his death. His parents had predeceased him. Consequently, the court ruled that the Fatal Accidents Act barred the brothers' action because there were no persons for whose benefit the action may be bought.
Furthermore, the Survival of Actions Act requires that there is a representative of the estate, such as an executor or administrator, in whose name the action is to be brought. Gerard and John each signed the statement of claim as "plaintiff's brother." The court explained that the Survival of Actions Act does not contemplate claims brought by siblings on behalf of the deceased person's estate. The court must appoint them as executors or administrators.
The court also noted that an action for a tort based upon professional negligence must be brought within two years after the right to bring an action arose. The court found that the statement of claim was issued outside of the time limited by the Limitations Act. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claims were statute-barred.
In any event, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish liability against the defendants. They did not present expert evidence showing the standard of care, a breach of that standard or evidence that the breach resulted in the injury and eventual death of Joseph Quinlan.
The court emphasized that in action for negligence against a physician or a health authority, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that there was a duty of care, a standard of care which was breached and that the breach caused the injuries suffered.
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to discharge their burden of proof. Instead, the court noted that "they took the position that they were the experts, that they saw what was happening and that Joseph Quinlan walked into Dr. Mann's office a well man and after the medical procedure was performed and he had been hospitalized, he waned, became a shell of his former self and died."
Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, finding that they have no standing, that the action is statute-barred, and that, in any event, there was no breach of the standard of care attributable to the defendants.
