References to legal advice and medical records did not constitute a waiver of privilege: court
The BC Supreme Court dismissed an application by Dr. Gerald Nemanishen, which argued that the plaintiff, Warren Homan, waived privilege in his reply to a medical negligence claim.
The dispute in Homan v Nemanishen, 2024 BCSC 735 centered around the confidentiality of solicitor-client privilege. Dr. Nemanishen's application claimed that Homan had inadvertently waived privilege by detailing his engagement with legal counsel and the timing of receiving medical records in his legal pleadings. These documents were pivotal in addressing a limitation defence that Dr. Nemanishen raised, arguing the claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act.
However, the court concluded that Homan's references to legal advice and the receipt of medical records did not constitute an explicit reliance on or disclosure of privileged communications.
The court's decision hinged on the principle that solicitor-client privilege should be maintained unless explicitly waived by the client. The court explained that privilege is only waived in "certain clearly defined circumstances" and does not extend to cases where a party’s understanding of their legal position or the advice they received merely becomes an issue in the litigation. This ruling aligns with previous judgments, reinforcing that the disclosure of privileged communications should only occur when absolutely necessary, preserving the integrity of legal advice.
Dr. Nemanishen contended that Homan's detailed pleadings about the timing of his legal consultations and the receipt of his medical records suggested a waiver of privilege. This argument was grounded in the belief that such disclosures put the plaintiff’s understanding of the legal advice at the forefront of the case, thereby justifying the need for privileged communications to be explored for a fair defense.
However, the Supreme Court differentiated between the mere relevance of legal advice to a party's claims and the explicit reliance on that advice as a defense mechanism. The court clarified that mentioning the receipt of legal counsel or medical records as part of factual assertions in pleadings does not automatically trigger a waiver of privilege. He pointed out that the fundamental issue was whether the plaintiff had crossed the “bright line where privilege is lost,” which involves more than just tangential references to legal interactions.
The court’s decision emphasized the high threshold for waiving solicitor-client privilege. It underscored the necessity of a party's explicit and voluntary disclosure of the contents of privileged legal advice for such a waiver to be recognized by the court.
