Parties did not cohabit for two years as required by BC's Family Law Act, ruling says
In a recent family law case, the British Columbia Supreme Court refused to declare the parties spouses upon finding that they had a violent relationship and did not reside together continuously for two years as the applicable legislation required.
The parties in R.A.K. v V.J.S, 2025 BCSC 578, characterized their relationship as tumultuous. They met in August 2015, moved in together in September 2016, and separated multiple times in the following three years. They had twins born in December 2018.
This summary trial matter dealt with competing applications. The claimant applied for a declaration that they were spouses under BC’s Family Law Act, 2011 (FLA) before their separation. The respondent applied to dismiss her ex-partner’s claim entirely and denied they were ever spouses.
The claimant alleged that the court should find that the cohabitation period was over three years for the purpose of his claim for family assets. Relying on s. 83(1) of the FLA, he argued that they lived together in a marriage-like relationship for 722 days in total between Sept. 6, 2016 and Aug. 20, 2019, their final separation date.
The respondent countered that they resided together in a marriage-like relationship for 362 days in total between Sept. 6, 2016 and Oct. 22, 2018, the day of the claimant’s arrest for assaulting her by choking her and threatening her with a knife when she was 7–8 months pregnant.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the claimant’s application seeking a declaration that the parties were spouses.
First, the court ruled that the parties never became spouses because they did not live together for a continuous period of at least two years and thus did not meet the definition of “spouse” under s. 3 of the FLA.
The court disagreed with the interpretation put forward by the claimant’s counsel relating to s. 83 of the FLA. The court noted that the provision referred to spouses, a term clearly defined in s. 3, and that the parties would only be deemed spouses who could access the separation/reconciliation mechanism in s. 83 if they lived in a marriage-like relationship for two years continuously.
Second, the court concluded that it could not call the parties’ relationship marriage-like. In reaching this conclusion, the court weighed the evidence shedding light on the nature and quality of the parties’ relationship from fall 2016 to fall 2019:
The court determined that claimant’s comments in his text messages to the respondent amounted to a clear and unequivocal repudiation of any marriage-like relationship that existed between that parties until that point.
The court then addressed the claimant’s allegation that they reconciled their marriage-like relationship when he moved in with the respondent again and resumed their relationship until they finally separated in October 2019.
The respondent countered that the claimant’s move into her home at that time was not a reconciliation but an accommodation enabling him to help her care for the twins and actively participate in the children’s lives.
The court favoured the respondent’s evidence on this point. The court explained that the evidence in this case supported that the claimant would do or say almost anything to harm the respondent or manipulate her for his own benefit.
Sumit Ahuja at Ahuja Litigation Mediation Arbitration represented the respondent in this summary judgment application.
