Arbitrator's award agrees with union's interpretation of vacation pay provision in its grievance
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal of a chambers judge’s ruling striking an employer’s application seeking judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision on the basis that the application was premature and the arbitral decision was not final.
The case of Saskatchewan Power Corporation v International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2067, 2025 SKCA 33 arose when a union filed a grievance alleging that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement’s terms when it refused to provide its members with vacation pay in line with art. 17.01 of the agreement.
Beginning in 2016, the parties tried and failed to resolve their dispute via mediation and other consensual measures. In 2021, they resorted to arbitration. Before the arbitration hearing, they agreed to bifurcate their dispute between the merits and remedy phases. They asked an arbitrator to decide the grievance’s merits.
In his award decision in July 2023, the labour arbitrator sustained the union’s grievance and agreed with its interpretation of art. 17.01. Without a settlement, he would retain jurisdiction to decide the monetary remedy and any disagreements in implementing the remedy, the arbitrator found.
At the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench, the employer brought a judicial review application seeking to quash or set aside the award decision. In response, the union wanted to dismiss or strike the employer’s application based on prematurity.
A chambers judge ruled that the award decision was not final, agreed with the union’s prematurity argument, and struck the employer’s judicial review application.
The employer appealed the chambers judge’s decision. It argued that the judge:
The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. The appeal court found that the chambers judge grasped the law relating to the application of prematurity as a bar to judicial review in the face of bifurcated proceedings.
First, the appeal court found that the chambers judge decided that, for the purpose of applying the prematurity doctrine, the award decision was not final because the arbitrator had not yet concluded the arbitration.
The appeal court noted that the chambers judge understood that the liability phase of the proceeding had concluded and that the parties had consented to bifurcate the arbitration when he made his finding that the arbitration proceedings were not yet done.
Next, the appeal court held that bifurcation by itself was not dispositive. The appeal court explained that the fact that the parties agree to bifurcate the arbitration proceedings between the liability and remedy phases did not dispose of the issue of whether judicial review should proceed before completion of the arbitration.
The appeal court added that another reason to reject the employer’s first argument was that labour law matters called for a position of restraint because early intervention by the courts could interfere with labour legislation’s policy objectives.
Regarding the employer’s second argument, the appeal court concluded that the chambers judge made no palpable and overriding error in how he assessed the relevant factors or considered whether exceptional circumstances called for judicial review to proceed before completion of the arbitration.
